Dheyaa Alwakeel
Diaa Al-Wakil Diaa Al-Wakil*
The ISIS suicide attacks have been overwhelmingly increasing over the past few days, so much that they became a usual phenomenon in the current military operations on more than one aspect. The most recent one was what happened in west of Samarra (Tharthar) a few days ago, where a gathering of troops in a military facility were attacked with a bombed tank coinciding with another suicidal bombing with a Hammer vehicle in the same site which resulted in a large number of casualties and a injuries. This method is not new to ISIS, as they used it before in Syria, and the most powerful demonstration of it was the targeting of Deir Al-Zor Military Airport with a bombed tank carrying over six tons of highly explosive substances. But what raises eyebrows over about the Samarra incident is the question of how was the bombed tank able to reach the meeting location? Did it suddenly emerge from an underground tunnel? Or did it fly in the sky and land on the meeting point to blow it up? Or perhaps it travelled through the organization’s sites and forbidden land between the two sides to reach the targeted location and blow it up with a suicide bombing!! And of course this is the most probable and realistic possibility. And since the tank is enormous in size with its heavy chain, huge diesel engine, and the loud voices it makes, especially if it’s bombed and shielded with additional armor, then detecting and addressing it would be within the capability and responsibility of the forces spread throughout the warfronts and was supposed to be under the surveillance of Intelligence and main observatories. Then again, how was it able to sneak past all that and evade those procedures? Where were the ambushes for explosive attacks? Where was the protection of the meeting? Where was the Intelligence effort? Where was the early warning? Where was the Air coverage?
These are questions that need adequate answers from those who run the file of shared military operations against ISIS, and I don’t think that anyone has a convincing perception and a well-done plan to face the suicide bombings challenge, otherwise it would have appeared though media and an explanation of what happened would have been presented!!
The mobile defense
From my stand and view I say that if ISIS was using this method for intimidation and achieving tactical goals in the field, then my reading for the situation would contradict with that. And I believe that resorting to suicide attacks expresses the frustration and fear of defeat complex that plagues this organization’s leaders. However, that reading doesn’t hide the other face of these dangerous operations that points towards a counter Intelligence activity that draws attention to the fact that the enemy selects targets, timing and location of attacks with clear effort to maximize and achieve the highest psychological impact possible.
What does the enemy aim to?
Break the spirits of the army and PMF.
Drain the fighting sectors and scatter their efforts.
Achieve tactical and psychological goals on both field and media levels.
And that situation leads us to the following diagnosis:
There is a weakness in the Intelligence aspect of our sectors.
There is need for a flexible military plan to counter bombers and suicidal attackers.
Failure of the defensive tactics or what’s called the hidden defense.
This situation raises many question marks on the American role in the war against ISIS; especially that it has the ability of air control and monitoring, and has a daily Intelligence analysis of everything that happens on the field.
How do we address this dangerous challenge!!??
We must immediately turn to active defensive resistance.
Implement sudden offensive operations to sustain the momentum of morale and frighten the enemy.
Energize the Intelligence aspect and activate its role in the battle.
Use the technology of electronic warfare (Eavesdropping and comm. jamming) which is absent from the operational scene.
Pay attention to the fighting spirit aspect and immunize against counter-war.
Figuring out the American situation and knowing the limits of cooperation and coordination so as to allow the military leadership to search for alternatives that enforce the combat ability.
Realistic recognition of the field needs.
Elect leaders and commanders according to professionalism, experience, and merit.
Set a counter process for explosive attacks and suicide bombers that include:
Early warning about suicide missions via moving ambush patrols.
Address explosives with a counter-weapon and obstruct its arrival to the target.
Destroy bomb-planting and vehicle-armoring sites and terrorist supporting workshops.
Intensify air scouting activity to monitor the operation field and hostile movements.
Benefit from the experience of the battles in Tikrit, Hamrin, and Diyala on that matter.
In conclusion I say that this war is chaotic, uneven, fast, and holds many surprises. And most importantly the fact that ISIS can’t swallow the vast areas they took over and that the terrorism, explosions, and suicide bombing methods didn’t save them from their historical crisis, and their leaders know that their defeat is inevitable and immanent.
